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ASSIGNMENT-GRATUITOUS PARTIAL ASSIGNMENT OF LEGACY IRREnVOCABLE.-
A legatee, after probate of the will, gratuitously assigned part ($1,500,000)
of her legacy to R by an instrument under seal, and notice thereof
was given to the executors. R assigned his interest to the plaintiff
bank for consideration. The executors were ordered by the legatee not to
pay the claim, and the bank, joining R as a plaintiff, thereupon brought a
suit in equity against the executors and the legatee. From a judgment
for the defendants, the plaintiffs appealed. Held, that the judgment be
reversed on the ground that the legatee's assignment constituted an irre-
vocable gift, whether the legatee's interest be regarded as an "equitable in-
terest," or a "legal chose in action." Chase Nat'l Bank v. Sayles, 11 Fed.
(2d) 948 (C. C. A. 1st, 1926).
A gratuitous assignment by a beneficiary of a trust is enforceable against
the trustee and the assignor. Curriden v. Chandler, 79 N. H. 269, 108 AtL.
296 (1919). It has been argued, however, that a gratuitous partial as-
signment cannot be made of a legal chose in action. Alger v. Scott, 54 N. Y.
14 (1873) ; (1916) 39 HAv. L. REv. 368; but see Dickinson, Gratuitous Par-
tial Assignments (1921) 31 YAT E LAw JOURNAL, 1. The theory advanced
is that "equity will not aid a volunteer" against his donor. See Dickinson,
op. cit. supra, at 6. A gratuitous total assignee recovers in an action at law
against the obligor and the assignor need not be joined. Cowen v. Browns-
ville Bank, 94 Tex. 547, 63 S. W. 532 (1901); of. Taylor v. Purdy, 151
Ky. 82, 151 S. W. 45 (1912). It would seem, then, that the suit by the
partial assignee is to enforce the obliger's duty, and not that of the assignor.
Owing to the adoption in most jurisdictions of codes uniting law and equity
in one system, the distinction between partial and total assignments should
be relatively unimportant. The instant decision appears sound whether
the legatee's right is labeled a "legal chose in action" or an "equitable
interest." It is in accord with the authorities. Matson v. Abbey, 70 Hun,
475, 24 N. Y. Supp. 284 (Sup. Ct. 1893), afJ'd 141 N. Y. 179, 36 N. E.
11 (1894); In re Thompson, 116 Misc. 453, 190 N. Y. Supp. 125 (Surr.
1921); of. Tarbox v. Grant, 56 N. J. Eq. 199, 39 Atl. 378 (1898) (total as-
signment held valid after death of assignor).
BANKRUPTCY-RIGHTS UNDER ASSIGNMENT OF HEIR'S EXPECTANCY Do
NOT PASS TO TRUSTEE OF BANKRUPT ASSIGNEE.-A purchased from two of
his brothers their respective expectancies in their mother's farm. The
mother died six days after A was adjudicated a bankrupt. The lower court
confirmed the title of the trustee in bankruptcy to the assigned interest.
Held, on appeal, that the decree be reversed on the ground that the assign-
ment did not create such property rights as would pass to the trustee in
bankruptcy. In re Baker, 13 Fed. (2d) 707 (C. C. A. 6th, 1926).
" . . . all . . . property which prior to the filing of the petition he (the
bankrupt) could by any means have transferred, or which might have been
levied upon" passes to the trustee in bankruptcy. Bankruptcy Act, U. S.
Comp. Stat. (1916) § 9654a (5). An heir's expectancy is not recognized
as such "property." Bank of Elberton v. Swift, 268 Fed. 305 (C. C. A. 5th,
1920) ; In re Wetmore, 108 Fed. 520 (C. C. A. 3d, 1901). But the assignee
of an expectancy is allowed specific performance against the heir when the
estate comes into the hands of the latter. Miller v. Miller, 283 S. W. 1085
(Tex. Civ. App. 1926); Clendening v. Wyatt, 54 Kan. 523, 38 Pac. 792
(1895); In re Lind [f915] 2 Ch. 345 (right to specific performance not dis-
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charged by assignor's bankruptcy). And, although the transaction is in
the form of a present assignment it is treated as a contract to aczign and
transfer, at least in equity. Mudge v. Hammill, 21 R. I. 283, 43 At]. 5,14
(1899); see Johnson v. Brccd ig, 136 Tenn. 528, 529, 530, 190 S. 1.7. 515
(1916). A trustee may enforce the bankrupt's right to specific pA..in-rmance
arising from an unexpected contract to convey land. O Z, -. 'at '. L. : ",
141 Ky. 25, 131 S. W. 1029 (1910); Dfflcld v. Dosh, 124 Iowa, 2S6, 99
N. W. 1074 (1904); see Rea v. Richards, 56 Ala. 39G, 397 (1876). Hence,
a contrary decision might well have been reached in the instant case.
BMi AND NOTES-CHECKS-RESPONSmmrrY OF Drwvwm-The defendant
paid money to a New York bank which had an account with a Rome ban:,
to cover checks drawn by the defendant on the Rome banh payable to the
plaintiff. Upon presentment after an unreasonable delay, payment was
refused due to withdrawal of funds by the trustee of the New York bank
which meanwhile had failed. Held, that the plaintiff recover on the ground
that the withdrawal of funds by the trustee was in reality a withdrawal
by the defendant. Ferrari v. First Nat'l Ban!1: of C1na. II h I27 .i-c.
330 (N. Y. Sup. Ct. 1926).
"A check must be presented for payment within a reasonable time after
its issue or the drawer will be discharged from liability thereon to the extent
of the loss caused by the delay." N. I. L. § 186. Where there are no funds
with the drawee, but the drawer has a reasonable e-.%pectancy that the bills
will be honored, the drawer is entitled to timely presentment and notice
of dishonor. Mazukiewicz v. Hanover Nat'l Ba2: of th Citer of NAl, York,
240 N. Y. 317, 145 N. E. 535 (1925) ; Edwards v. Moo,% 11 N. C., McC. 4"3
(S. C. 1820). An agreement between the drawer and a third party whereby
the latter is to furnish funds, has been held to give rise to such an e.pec-
tancy. French v. Bank of Columbia, 4 Cranch, 141 (U. S. 1807) ; cf. Bovcn
-. Needles Nat'l Bank, 87 Fed. 430 (C. C. S. D. Calif. 1S08). Where the
drawee becomes bankrupt prior to presentment, but after an unreasonable
delay, the drawer of a check is discharged to the amount of the 'loss caused
by the delay." Peninsula Nat'l Bazl v. Hans Pedtcron Conpt. Co., 91 Wash.
621, 158 Pac. 246 (1916); Dehoust v. Lewis, 128 App. Div. 131, 112 N. Y.
Supp. 559 (2d Dept. 1908). And where a principal caused his debt to be
paid by his agent's check for which he had supplied the fund", and the
check was presented after an unreasonable delay and dishonored because
the agent had misappropriated the funds, it was held that as between the
principal and the payee, the latter should bear the loss caused by the delay.
Kilpatrick v. Home Building & Loan Association, 119 Pa. St. 00, 12 Atl.
754 (1888). The policy involved in such decisions protecting the drawer
from loss due to dilatory payees should be equally applicable in the instant
case if the New York bank failed after an unreasonable delay.
CONSTITUTIONAl LAW---IINTEREST"l OF LANDLORD INSUFFICIENT TO CON-
TEST VALIDITY OF SEGREGATION ORDINANCE.-A landlord sued to restrain
the city of New Orleans from enforcing an ordinance creating white and
black "communities," alleging that the ordinance interfered with the renting
of its property to negroes. Held, that the plaintiff's "interest" was too re-
mote to entitle it to an injunction. Land Dcvelopmcnt Co. v,. New Orleans,
13 Fed. (2d) 898 (D. La. 1926).
A party can not test the constitutionality of an act unless he has a legal
"interest" that will be affected by it. COoLEY, CONSTITUrri.AL L -IvITATxo:.
(7th ea. 1903) 232. The content of the term "interest" is difficult to
determine. Thus where the plaintiff was a subcontractor engaged in worh
that was later prohibited by ordinance it was held that he lacked sufficient
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"interest" to contest its validity. Davis & Farnum Mfg. Go. v. Los Anrch.4,
189 U. S. 207, 23 Sup. Ct. 498 (1903). Also, where the plaintiff held bonds
of another state and sought to test the validity of legislation which he
contended jeopardized his investment. Marye v. Parsons, 114 U. S. 325, 5
Sup. Ct. 932 (1884) (statute annulled provision that coupons be acceptable
for taxes); Board of Liquidation v. McComb, 92 U. S. 531 (1875) (illegal
increase of state debt). But it has been held that the trustees of bond-
holders of a railroad could enjoin the enforcement of unreasonable rates,
on the ground that the bondholders were the equitable owners of the railroad.
Reagan v. Farmer's Loan & Trust Co., 154 U. S. 362, 14 Sup. Ct. 1062
(1894). Likewise, an alien employee was allowed to contest the validity of
a statute prohibiting an employer from employing more than twenty per
cent aliens. Truax v. Raich, 239 U. S. 33, 36 Sup. Ct. 7 (1915). And it has
beeh held that a plaintiff could test the validity of an act if others upon
whom he is depending for support were deprived of their constitutional
rights. Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U. S. 510, 45 Sup. Ct. 571 (1925).
The instant ordinance deprives the plaintiff of the power to rent his house to
negroes. It seems, therefore, that he had a sufficient "interest" to test its
validity. The court was influenced by the fact that the plaintiff had a similar
action pending in the state court. But it was recently held that the more
pendency of a suit in a state court to enjoin the enforcement of an alleged
unconstitutional law was no bar to a similar suit in a federal court.
General Outdoor Advertising Co. v. Williams, 12 Fed. (2d) 773 (C. C. A.
1st, 1926). Moreover, with a holding that the plaintiff has no adequat,)
"interest," it is difficult to see how he would be in any better p~oition in
a federal court after having obtained an adverse state decision.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAw-ORDINANCE SEGREGATING WHITES AND BLACKS
INTO SEPARATE "COIal.IUNITIES" WITHIN CITY UPHELD.-A New Orleans
ordinance prohibited whites from establishing residences in negro "com-
munities" within the city and negroes from establishing reqidence in white
"communities" without the written consent of the people of opposite race in
that neighborhood. The plaintiff sought to restrain the defendant from rent-
ing his house to a negro. The plea of the defendant that the ordinance de-
prived him of his property contrary to the Fourteenth Amendment was sus-
tained in the lower court. Held, on appeal, that the judgment be reversed.
Tyler v. Harmon, 158 La. 439, 104 So. 200 (1925).
Since the prohibitions of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments apply
only to the federal and state governments, covenants not to convey land
to a negro are upheld. Torrey v. Wolfes, 6 Fed. (2d) 702 (D. C. App.
1925); Corrigan v. Buckley, 46 Sup. Ct. 521 (1926); (1926) 35 YALE LAW
JOURNAL, 755. Ordinances, however, for the future segregation of white
and colored races have usually been upheld by state courts as an exercise of
the police power. State v. Gurry, 121 Md. 534, 88 Atl. 546 (1913); Harris
v. City of Louisville, 165 Ky. 559, 177 S. W. 472 (1915). Contra: State V.
Darnell, 166 N. C. 300, 81 S. E. 338 (1914); Carey v. City of Atlanta, 143
Ga. 192, 84 S. E. 456 (1915). But the United States Supreme Court has
held an ordinance very similar to that in the instant case to be a violation
of the Fourteenth Amendment. Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U. S. 60, 38 Sup.
Ct. 16 (1917). The instant decision purports to distinguish the New
Orleans ordinance on the ground that the ordinance in Buchanan v. Warlcy,
supra, in effect prohibited a sale to negroes. There would seem, however,
to be no difference for this purpose between a sale and a lease. Moreover,
the instant ordinance would very likely have had the same effect had the
defendant attempted to sell to a negro. Apparently, the only actual differ-
ence between the ordinances is that the instant ordinance permits a person
RECENT CASE NOTES
to move into a prohibited section with the written consent of the perzons of
opposite race. Query,'however, whether this is a distinction in fact in view
of the probability that a neg ro could not get such consent.
CRIINAL LAW-INDIOxTGENTs--SETTING FORTH OFFENSE IN WensDs OF
STATUTE HELD INSUFFICimNT.-The National Prohibition Act prvid(-c that
"'any . . . house . . . where intoxicating liquor is manufactured,
sold, kept, or bartered in violation of this title . . is hereby declared
to be a common nuisance." U. S. Comp. Stat. (Supp. 1923) § 1013S1.ji.
The indictment charged that the defendants "did . . unlawfully main-
tain a common nuisance, that is to say, at the premises known as the Bis-
mark Cafe, where intoxicating liquors . . were l:ept, in viulation" c.tc.
The lower court sustained the indictment. Held, on appeal, (one judge
dissenting) that the judgment be reversed on the ground that the indict-
ment did not set forth that liquor was kept for sale. Aronioss v. Unitcd
States, 13 Fed. (2d) 620 (C. C. A. 3d, 1926).
Generally, a statutory indictment is good if it alleges the offense in the
]anguagd of the statute. United States v. Mills, 32 U. S. 138 (1833).
Greater particularity of pleading, however, is required where the statute
does not itself specifically define the particular crime for which the defendant
is being tried. United States v. Carl, 105 U. S. 611 (1881). Or where the
statute uses technical or generic terms. State v. Han.son, 23 Tex. 232
(1859); Rex v. Chalkley, R. & R. Cr. Cas. 253 (1313). Or where itz lan-
guage may include innocent acts. Schmidt v. State, 78 Ind. 41 (1881).
The instant court argued that, though the statute made the keeping of
liquor an offense and the indictment alleged such an act, nevertheless, since
such keeping might be lawful, the indictment was defective. The same
court, however, has held that when an indictment for conspiracy alleged
that an offense had been "unlawfully" committed, the use of the word
"unlawful" excluded the exceptional case where the act charged might b3
lawfully performed. Rulovitch v. United Statcs, 236 Fed. 31 (C. C. A.
3d, 1923). The great detail required in pleading the offense in a statutory
indictment is a survival of the ancient common law procedure when it was
necessary to favor the defendant because of the severe penalties for minor
offenses. See Tapack v. United States, 220 Fed. 445, 447 (C. C. A. 3d,
1915); Willard, The Seventeenth Century Indictmncnt (1911) 24 HAnM. L.
REv. 290. But if the function of criminal pleading is to put each side and
the court on notice as to what issues will be raised at the trial, such nicety
of detail is undesirable. See Miller, The Function of Criminal Pleading
(1922) 12 J. AM. INST. OF CRM. LAw AND CRIMINOLOGY, 500, 505; Clarl:,
History, Systems and Functions of Pleading (1925) 11 VA. L. Ruv. 517,
544. Since the defendants in the instant case kept a caf, and thv indict-
ment so alleged, it cannot be seriously contended that they were surprised.
While a similar indictment was sustained by a federal court in California,
it was held insufficient by a Florida federal court. Kathrincr v. United
States, 276 Fed. 808 (C. C. A. 9th, 1921); United States V. DoW1ing, 273
Fed. 630 (S. D. Fla. 1922).
INSOLVENCY-SECURED CREDITOR PRECLUDED FRoM PROVING Two CLums
'WHERE INSOLVENT HAS CONVERTED SECURITY.-A warehouse company which
owned certain cotton pledged its warehouse receipt to a bank as collateral
security for its promissory note. After tortiously disposing of the cotton,
it became insolvent. The bank sought to prove two claims against the assets
in the hands of the receiver, one for conversion, and the other for the
unpaid balance of the debt minus the dividend sought on the first claim.
The referee allowed only one dividend. The lower court overruled excep-
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tions to the award. Held, on appeal, (two judges dissenting) that the judg-
ment be affirmed on the ground that only one claim was provable because
there was but one debt. Appeal of Atlantic Nat'l Bank., 134 S. E. 395 (S. C.
1926).
Where a chattel mortgagor sells the chattel without the consent of the
mortgagee, the latter may sue the mortgagor for conversion, but recovery
is limited to the amount of the debt. Ashmead v.. Kellogg, 23 Conn. 70
(1854) ; Parish v. Wheeler, 22 N. Y. 494 (1860). Likewise, where the
pledger in possession disposes of the pledge. Hurst v. Coley, 15 Fed. 645
(C. C. Ga. 1882); Rolfe v. Huntsville Lumber Go., 8 Ala. App. 487, 62 So.
537 (1913). Moreover, where the mortgagor of real estate insures the
premises without providing for the interest of the mortgagee (no provision
for same being contained in the mortgage) the latter has no right to the
proceeds of the policy. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co. v. Pennsylvania Plate
Glass Co., 186 U. S. 434, 22 Sup. Ct. 842 (1902); Vance, Insurance (1904)
418. The same is true of a mechanic lienor. In re San Joaquin Valley Pack-
ing Co., 295 Fed. 311 (C. C. A. 9th, 1924). Thus it appears that irrespectivo
of whether the creditor's security is extinguished by accident or by the
wrongful act of the debtor, the creditor has merely a right to the payment
of the debt. The same result as in the instant case is reached where the
creditor has two notes of the insolvent, one as collateral for the other. Firs t
Nat'l Bank v. Eason, 149 Fed. 204 (C. C. A. 5th, 1906).
INSURANCE-NoN-ComI'LIANCOE WITH FORMALITIES OF PENAL SALES
STATUTE BARS RECOvERY.-A statute provided that the sale of an auto-
mobile, without a formal bill of sale, identification of seller, etc., is a mis-
demeanor. Kan. Rev. Stat. (1923) c. 8, §§ 117-119. The plaintiff bought
an automobile from a stranger without complying with the statute. The
defendant issued to the plaintiff a theft policy, containing the customary
warranties of sole ownership and correct description of the automobile.
The plaintiff innocently misstated the engine number. The automobile
was subsequently stolen and the plaintiff sued on the policy. From a judg-
ment for the plaintiff, defendant appealed. Held, that the judgment be
reversed on the ground that the plaintiff had no "insurable interest," the
sale being made in violation of the statute. Morris v. Firemen's Ins. Co. of
New Jersey, 247 Pac. 852 (Kan. 1926).
Undei similar statutes some courts have held in accord with the instant
case. Hennessey v. Auto Onwers' Ins. Ass'n, 273 S. W. 1024 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1925); State v. Cox, 306 Mo. 537, 268 S. W. 87 (1924) (statute made
sale "void"); but cf. Carolina Discount Corp. v. Landes Motor Co., 129
S. E. 414 (N. C. 1925). However, one having jural relations which would
be injuriously affected by loss of the property has an "insurable interest."
(1925) 34 YALE LAw JOURNAL, 444; (1923) 32 ibid. 497; cf. Getchell v1. Mu-
tual Fire Ins. Co., 109 Me. 274, 83 Atl. 801 (1912). The buyer in the instant
case should be held to have such a jural relation, for the violation of tho
statute would not prevent his possession from being protected. Grapcland
Motor Co. v. Lively, 274 S. W. 168 (Tex. Civ. App. 1925) (against seller);
cf. Platner v. Bourne, 275 S. W. 590 (Mo. 1925). The insurer has the burden
of proving that the assured is not the "sole owner" within the meaning of
the policy. Atlas Fire & Tornado Ins. Co. v. Malone, 99 Ark. 428, 138 S. W.
962 (1911); Milhim v. Hawkeye Ins. Co., 171 Ill. App. 262 (1912). Since
*there was no evidence that the plaintiff had purchased a stolen car, to
hold that he had no "insurable interest" merely because of failure to com-
ply with the statute in effect inflicts an additional penalty, i.e., the loss
of insurance. It would seem that the fine provided by the legislature for
violation of such statutes should suffice. The decision might be sustained,
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however, on the ground that the misstatement of the engine number con-
stituted a breach of a material warranty.
JUDGMENTS-WIFE'S JUDGMENT FOR BREACH OF SEPAITION AGzIz,';T
CANNOT BE SATISFIED FROm HUSBAND'S JUDGMENT FOR ALIENATION OF FFEC-
TIONS-The defendant husband in a previous action recovered a judgment
against S for alienating his wife's affections. Subsequently, the wife recov-
ered a judgment against her husband for breach of a separation agresment.
One month before this judgment was rendered, the husband assigned one half
of his judgment to his attorney, and the other half to C (whether for
consideration or not, does not appear). The plaintiff sued her husband
and his assignees to have the assignment set aside, and to have her judg-
ment declared a lien on the husband's judgment. Held, for the defendants
on the ground that the plaintiff should not profit by her own wrong.
Swartzlander v. Swartzlander, 127 Misc. 801 (N. Y. Sup. Ct. 1926).
A transfer of a debtor's assets, if made without sufficient consideration
and in apprehension of an impending unfavorable judgment, is inoperative
if prejudicial to the judgment creditor. Light v. Fisher, 162 App. Div.
483, 147 N. Y. Supp. 683 (1st Dept. 1914); Lougheed v. Armstrong, 84
N. J. Eq. 49, 92 Atl. 93 (1914). Accordingly, there being no evidence
in the instant case that the assignment to C was for a sufficient consid-
eration, it should have been set aside, unless precluded by the plaintiff's
alleged misconduct. An insolvent debtor has the power (in the absence
of a statute forbidding preference by a debtor) to transfer all his assets
to one creditor. Levy v. Weidhorn, 2S7 Fed. 754 (D. Mass. 1923); cf. Dc-
laney v. Valentine, 154 N. Y. 692, 49 N. E. 65 (1898). And a convey-
ance to a non-creditor for sufficient consideration will not be set aside
unless made with "intent" to defraud creditors, of which "intent" the
transferee had knowledge. Vanderlip v. Ba,.es, 101 Neb. 573, 163 N. W.
856 (1917); of. Burnwell Coal Co. v. Setzer, 203 Ala. 395, 83 So. 139 (1919).
This rule, however, is made ambiguous by the qualification that a man
is "presumed to intend the natural consequences of his acts.' See Bnvwcli
Coal Co. v. Setzer, supra, at 396, 83 So. at 140; Courscy v. Morton, 102 N.
Y. 556, 560, 30 N. E. 231, 232 (1892). Thus, if the transfer would in
fact place the assets beyond reach of the creditors, and the transferee
knows or has reason to know that there are creditors who would be thus
prejudiced, the courts will hold the transfer invalid as to creditoro. Smith
Co. v. Austin Co., 143 Ga. 254, 84 S. E. 444 (1915); Grecnwald v,. Wales,
174 N. Y. 140, 66 N. E. 665 (1903); but cf. Levy v. Weidhorn, supra.
If, therefore, the assignment to the defendant attorney was not to meet
an existing claim, it should have been set aside. The fact that the plain-
tiff may have allowed her affections to be alienated should have no bear-
ing on the ease. Cf. Vanderlip v. Banwcs, supra. The husband had al-
ready recovered a judgment which was supposed to compensate him for
such alienation.
MUNICIPAL CORPoRATIONs-CHARTER PROvISION LimiTING HEIGHT OF
BUILDINGS NOT APPLICABLE TO CITY HALL.-A contract was awarded for
the construction of a city hall 400 feet in height. The defendant, who
was authorized to sign the contract for the city, refused on the ground
that the city charter prohibited the erection of buildings over 150 feet in
height in that portion of the city. The contractor brought mandamus pro-
ceedings to compel the defendant to sign. Held, that the writ be granted.
Kubach Co. v. McGuire, 248 Pac. 676 (Calif. 1926).
The instant case follows the "rule" that state agencies are not bound
by general legislation unless included expressly or by necessary impli-
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cation. Marin Water Dist. v. Chenu, 188 Calif. 734, 207 Pac. 251 (1922);
Milwaukee v. McGregor, 140 Wis. 35, 121 N. W. 642 (1909). But its ap-
plication depends upon the facts of the particular case. Thus it is applied
when it reaches results consonant with the court's conception of "policy."
Cf. United States v. Herron, 20 Wall. 251 (U. S. 1873) (discharge in
bankruptcy not bar to tax claim); State Land Board v, Lee, 84 Or. 431,
165 Pac. 372 (1917) (statute of limitations); Balthasar v. Pacific Elcot.
Ry., 187 Calif. 302, 202 Pac. 37 (1921) (traffic regulations not applicable to
fire department on duty). Where, however, the application of the rule
would reach a result contrary to the court's conception of "policy," it is
not applied. Baron de Bode v. Regina, 13 Q. B. 364 (1848) (statute pro-
viding for appeal to Exchequer Chamber held applicable to crown);
of. Commonwealth v. Closson, 229 Mass. 329, 118 N. E. 653 (1918) (traffic
regulation applicable to U. S. mail truck). Thus the "rule" is of little
service. Had it been shown that the erection of the building contemplated
in the instant case would have resulted in pecuniary injury to adjacent
landowners, a different conclusion might have been reached regardless of
the "rule."
NEGLIdENCE-RESPONSIBILITY OF CONTRACTOR TO THIRD PERSON AFTEnR
ACCEPTANCE OF WORK BY OWNER.-The plaintiff's decedent, while attend-
ing a theatre, was killed by the collapse of the roof and balcony. The
declaration alleged negligence by the owner, architect and defendant con-
tractor whose work had been accepted by the owner prior to the accident.
The lower court overruled the defendant's demurrer. Held, on appeal,
that the demurrer be sustained, since there was no "privity" of contract
between the decedent and the defendant. Ford v. Sturgis, 14 Fed. (2d) 253
(App. D. C. 1926).
The rule of Winterbottom v. Wright, 10 M. & W. 107 (Ex. 1842), fol-
lowed in the instant case, has been substantially repudiated in many juris-
dictions in cases involving injury caused by defective chattels or realty.
MacPherson v. Buick Co., 217 N. Y. 382, 111 N. E. 1050 (1916); O'Brien
v. American Bridge Co., 110 Minn. 364, 125 N. W. 1012 (1910); (1920)
30 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 607. Likewise in the case of damage to property.
Wade v. Gray, 104 Miss. 151, 61 So. 168 (1913) (horse injured on defective
highway). See Feezer, Tort Liability of Manufacturers and Vendors
(1926) 60 Am. L. REv. 507. Also, lack of "privity" of contract is no
defense to a lessor of a defective public structure in an action for injuries to
third persons. Kane--v. Lauer, 52 Pa. Super. Ct. 467 (1913) (grand-stand).
If the injury is in fact caused by the defendant's negligence it should be
immaterial that the negligence occurred in the performance by the defend-
ant of a contract with a third party. [Compare the modern code require-
ment that the plaintiff merely state the historical narrative of the events.
See Clark, Complaint in Code Pleading (1926) 35 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 259,
280.] It is well settled that a contractor is responsible to third persona
for similar injuries during the process of construction. Pasquini V. Lowery,
63 Hun, 632, 18 N. Y. Supp. 284 (1892) ; Flanagan v. Wells Bros., 139 IlI.
App. 237, aff'd 237 Ill. 82, 86 N. E. 609 (1908). This responsibility should
continue after the work is completed, for a defective structure is just as
likely to collapse after acceptance as before. Such a holding would not
discourage building for the contractor could protect himself by public lia-
bility insurance against accidents which might occur after as well as dur-
ing construction.
PLEADING--NO SEPARATE APPEAL FROM DISMISSAL OF EQUITABLE DE-
FENSES.-The defendant set up equitable and legal defenses to an action.
RECENT CASE NOTES
The lower court held the equitable defenses invalid and the defendant ap-
pealed before the legal defenses were tried. Held, that the appeal be
dismissed since there was no final judgment from which an appeal could
be taken. Einlenton Refining Co. v. Chambers, 14 Fed. (2d) 10- (C. C. A.
3d, 1926).
In general an appeal is allowed only from final judgment or orders.
(1925) 34 YALE LAW JOURNA4L, 905. Under federal procedure, when there
are both equitable and legal defenses the former must be tried first.
Horback v. Coyle, 2 Fed. (2d) 702 (C. C. A. 8th, 1924) ; Fay v. Hill, 249
Fed. 415 (C. C. A. 8th, 1918). It has been suggested that the only dis-
tinction between equitable and legal defenses is historical. Cook, Equitable
Defenses (1923) 32 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 645. There seems to be no
reason, therefore, for separating them for purposes of appeal. A con-
trary rule would permit piecemeal appeals and needlessly protract trials.
PLEADING-PRAYER Fon EQUITABLE RELIEF IN ACTIoN O EJECTrm:,T.-
In an action to recover possession of certain portions of premi+ses which
the defendant claimed under a lease from the plaintiff, the latter also
asked damages, reformation and an injunction. The lower court found
that reformation was not necessary but gave judgment for the plaintiff
for recovery of possession and damages, and granted the injunction. Held,
on appeal, that the judgment be affirmed. Mirando v. Mirando, 104 Conn.
318, 132 Atl. 910 (1926).
Though the codes attempted to do away with the distinction bctueen
law and equity, a number of code states compel the plaintiff to adopt and
recover on one theory of pleading only. Mescall v. Tully, 91 Ind. 9G
(1883); Sorensen v. School Dlstrict, 122 Alinn. 59, 141 N. W. 1105 (1913).
See Whittier, The Theory of a Pleading (1908) 8 CoL. L. Rv. 523. For
a criticism of that view see Clark, The Complaint in Code Pleading (192G)
35 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 259, 282. Other more liberal code jurisdictions
allow the plaintiff to unite two or more forms of action in his complaint.
Craft Refrigerating Co. v. Qtinnipiac Brewing Co., 63 Conn. 551, 29 AtI.
76 (1893). Or legal and equitable claims. Phillips v. Gorha7m-,, 17 N. Y.
270 (1858) ; cf. Hahl v. Sugo, 169 N. Y. 109, 62 N. E. 135 (1901). The court
in the instant case in following the latter view carries out the true spirit
of the codes. See Clark, The Union of Law and Eqzity (1925) 25 Coi-
L. REv. 1, 3, 4.
PUBLic UTILITIES--RATE REGULATION-DTErIINATION OF TIM RATO
BAsE.The plaintiff company had acquired gas lands and leases at a low
price and later sought to charge rates based on their present trebled value.
The Public Service Commission refused to permit the new schedule of rates.
Held, on appeal, that the ruling be affirmed since the old rates gave a fair
return oh the "present value" of all the property "used and useful for the
public." The court included as "used and useful" only that third of the
plaintiff's land which had been proven to contain gas and e:xcluded that
which might be useful in the future. United Fzel Gas Co. v. Pztblfc Scr-
vice Comiz. of West Virginia, 14 Fed. (2d) 209 (S. D. W. Va. 1920).
In spite of the practically universal criticism of text writers, the courts
adhere to the "present value" rule of rate making, whereby rates are to
be charged on the present value of the utility's property presently used for
the public. Missouri ex rel. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co. v. Public Scrvice
Corzn. of Missouri, 262 U. S. 276, 43 Sup. Ct. 541 (1923). But see Bauer,
Effective Regulation of Public Utilities (1925). According to this rule,
the actual cost is to be considered as a factor in ascertaining the value,
but it is not a limitation on the rate base when the property has appre-
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ciated. Pennsylvania Gas Co. v. Public Service Comm. of New York, 211
App. Div. 253, 207 N. Y. Supp. 599 (3d Dept. 1925). The plaintiff in the
instant case contended that the rate base should include a valuation of re-
serves that would in the future be used for the public. A few courts permit
the inclusion of "reasonable" reserves. Eric City v. Public Ser vice Comm.,
278 Pa. 512, 123 Atl. 471 (1924); Borough of Lewiston v. Public Service
Comm., 80 Pa. Super. Ct. 528 (1923) (reservoir not in use given half value).
This encourages the acquisition of reserve land at low prices, but if the
valuation is on the "present value" theory, it puts too great a burden on the
public, since the public pays both for the appreciated value and for the early
investment of the company. Most courts do not allow rates to be charged on
this potentially useful property. Spring Valley Water Co. v. San Francisco,
165 Fed. 667 (N. D. Calif. 1908); Acquackanonk Water Co. v. Board of
Public Utility Com' rs, 100 N. J. L. 169, 125 Atl. 33 (1924) (50% of value
of reservoir excluded because too large) ; of. Town of Mamaroneck v. New
York Interurban Water Co., 126 Misc. 382, 212 N. Y. Supp. 639 (Sup. Ct.
1925) (equipment no longer used). If the valuation were according to
the "actual prudent investment" theory, these reserves would be "useful to
the public" because they would represent a future saving for the public
as well as for the company.
QUASI-CONTRACTS-ECONOMIC DuPEss.-The defendant was the principal
bondholder of a corporation. He was also the chief member of a com-
mittee with which title to all the bonds had been placed in trust with
power to do whatever was necessary to protect the bondholders' interests.
The plaintiff agreed with the committee to purchase the bondholders' prop-
erty at a certain price. Before ratification of this agreement by the bond-
holders, the defendant threatened to block the ddal unless the plaintiff
agreed to give him secretly the equivalent of about $200,000. The plain-
tiff, on the consummation of the sale, gave the defendant the sum de-
manded in securities and notes. Two years later the plaintiff demanded
a return of the securities or their value. The defendant then turned over
a proportionate share of the secret profits to the other bondholders. The
plaintiff sued to recover their value contending inter alia, that he had been
coerced into the agreement. Held, that the bill be dismissed. Marshall
v. Lovell, 11 Fed. (2d) 632 (D. Minn. 1926).
Money paid under "economic pressure" is generally recoverable. Wood-
ward, Quasi-Contracts (1913) §§ 212, 213; Westlake v. St. Louis, 77 Mo.
47 (1882) (payment of excessive water tax under threat of having water
turned off); see Robertson v. Frank Bros., 132 U. S. 17, 21, 10 Sup. Ct. 5,
6 (1889) (payment of money to customs official to avoid onerous penalty).
The courts do not, however, apply this rule without reservation. (1924) 34
YALE LAW JOURNAL, 449, 450; see Crittendon v. Royce, 100 Conn. 617, 620,
124 At]. 215, 216 (1924). But they are more likely to apply it where, beside
disapproving of the acts of the defendant, they also disapprove of the end
in view. March v. Bricklayers' Union, 79 Conn. 7, 63 Atl. 291 (1906).
Thus recovery has been allowed even where both parties have been guilty
of unlawful conduct, when the court considered that "public policy" de-
manded the punishment of the defendant rather than denial of relief to
the plaintiff. Webb v. Fulchire, 25 N. C. 485 (1843) (recovery in quasi-
contract of money lost in shell game); Lembo v. Donnell, 117 Me. 143, 103
AtI. 11 (1918) (where plaintiff who underwent illegal operation was re-
garded as victim of sudden temptation, and defendant regarded as pro-
fessional criminal); Saylor v. Crooker, 97 Kan. 624, 156 Pac. 737 (1916)
(where denial of relief would give effect to original illegal contract);
(1917). 27 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 1090. But in none of these cases were the
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interests of third parties knowingly affected by the acts of the plaintiff.
In the instant case, however, the real parties to be injurcd wCre the bond-
holders. If the defendant had not turned over a proportionate share of
the profits to them, they could have recovered at least such share in an
action against him. In re Ahrczds, 130 AtI. 219 (N. J. 1925) ; 3 Pomeroy,
Eqaity Jurisprudence (4th ed. 1913) § 1077. The plaintiX, a stranger tj the
relation between the bondholders and the defendant, was himself a party to
the agreement which was injurious to the bondholders. The dcnial of re-
covery seems proper.
REAL PROPERTY-DUTY OF LICENSEE TO REMOVE RIAILWAY BUILT ONI AND
OF ANOTHE-By contract, the plaintiff was granted a license to build a
"never-stop" railway on the defendant's land at Wembley, and the option
of selling the railway at the termination of the exhibition. In a suit to
determine whether the option had lapsed, the defendant counterclaimed
for an order compelling the plaintiff to remove the railway, or for damages
for letting it remain. The cost of removal was estimated at £S000. Hcld,
that the counterclaim be dismissed, since no agreement to remove the rail-
way should be implied. Never-Stop Ry. v. British Empire Ex4hibitioon, 135
L. T. 405 (Ch. 1926).
The instant holding recites the general rule that whatever is annexcd to
the land becomes part of it. See Minshall v. Lloyd, 2 I. & W. 450, 4509
(Ex. 1837). But a rule derived from cases where both lessor and lezzee
claim the fixtures, should not be conclusive where neither claims them.
However, recovery by the lessor of the expense of removing flxturcs aban-
doned by a lessee at the expiration of his lease has been denied. Perry v.
Mott Iron Wor'zs Co., 207 Mass. 501, 93 N. E. 793 (1911). On the ground
that alterations made by the lessee with the consent of the lessor do not
constitute waste. Doe v. Jones, 4 B. & Ad. 126 (K. B. 1832); Pfictcr v.
Fitzpatrick, 197 Mass. 277, 83 N. E. 878 (1903); Rcx Amnicmnt Co. v.
Nolan, 11 Ohio App. 318 (1918). Hence it seems that there is no duty
in a lessee to remove fixtures unless the court sees fit to "imply" an agree-
ment to remove them, basing its "implication" on what it thinhs the
parties would have done had they foreseen that the fixtures might become
encumbrances on the land.
REAL PRormTY-EEcTMENT-EQurrABLE ESTOPPEL AS A DEFz'sE AT
CoMMON LAW-MISTAIE.-The plaintiff sold a lot to the defendant, both
parties intending that the land up to a certain fence should be trans-
ferred. The deed by mistake described only a portion of this land. In
an action of ejectment for the part not dezcribed, judgment was given
for the plaintiff. Held, on appeal, that the judgment be affirmed, since
in an action of ejectment the parties are bound by the deed. Sta Food
Co. v. Meyer, 109 So. 674 (Miss. 1926).
In code states similar facts have been held an equitable defense to actions
of ejectment. Hoppough v. Strnble, 60 N. Y. 430 (1S75) ; Mcclxr v. Dalton,
75 Calif. 154, 16 Pac. 764 (1888). Although there is some conflict as to
whether they should be pleaded as an equitable defense or a counter-claim.
Clark, Trial of Actions Under the Code (1926) 9 CoRN. L. Q. 4S2. A few
common law jurisdictions hold that facts creating an "equitable ectoppel"
are not available as a defense to common law actions. City of Amboy -e.
Illinois Central R. R., 236 IMI. 236, 86 N. E. 238 (190); Cazcbnan v.
Bialas, 112 Va. 57, 70 S. E. 479 (1911); Wiacer -. Ficklipn, 14 Bush. 193
(Ky. 1878). But otherwise in most jurisdictions. Dic:crzo v. Colgrove,
100 U. S. 578 (1879); Boynton v. Hunt, 88 Vt. 187, 92 At. 153 (1914);
No-ris v. Billingsley, 48 Fla. 102, 37 So. 564 (1904). Although this doc-
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trine, even in the jurisdictions where it is recognized, is not applied in all
circumstances, it seems to have been applied where the plaintiff is said to
have conveyed the "equitable title." In such cases the plaintiff is "es-
topped" from maintaining ejectment for the land. Norris 'v, Billingsley,
supra (contract to sell land); Berry v. Seawall, 65 Fed. 742 (C. C. A. 6th,
1895) (oral agreement of partition); of. Brown v. Wheeler, 17 Conn. 345
(1845) (partition agreement invalid under Statute of Frauds "estops"
partitioners from denying partition at law). Mississippi recognizes such
"equitable estoppel" as a defense at common law in some cases. Cr-slcr ,.
Whadley, 102 Miss. 755, 59 So. 886 (1912) (replevin). And the plaintiff
in the instant case seems to have conveyed the equitable title to the land
in dispute to the defendant. Cf. Hoppough v. Struble, supra. The in-
stant case, therefore, might well have reached a contrary result more in
accord with modern views. This question is of importance not only in the
common law jurisdictions but also in the, code states, since the right to
jury trial exists in respect to these issues if the defense is one which would
have been available at common law. Clark, op. cit. supra.
SURETYSHIP-DISCHARGE OF SURETY COMPANY BY PREIATURE PAYMENT
ON CONTRACT.-To keep R, a road contractor, out of bankruptcy, the plain-
tiff promised him an additional payment for work already done, provided
his forces were reorganized. This revision was approved by the defendant
company as surety on R's bond for faithful performance. The plaintiff
paid the increase although no reorganization took place. When R finally
defaulted, the plaintiff sued on the bond. The lower court directed a ver-
dict for the defendant. Held, on appeal, that the judgment be reversed.
Pickens County v. National Surety Co., 13 Fed. (2d) 758 (C. C. A. 4th,
1926).
Under the rule of strictissimi juris, a "material" departure from the
terms of the contract, though beneficial to the principal, discharges the
non-consenting surety. Lyons v. Kitchell, 18 N. M. 82, 134 Pac. 213 (1913)
(premature payment); Washington Finance Corp. v. Glass, 74 Wash. 653,
134 Pac. 480 (1913) (reduction of note); Snodgrass v. Shader, 113 Ark.
429, 168 S. W. 567 (1914) (reduction of rent). But the courts have often
held that the compensated corporate surety must show injury to be dis-
charged by such departure. National Surety Co. v. Lincoln County, 238
Fed. 705 (C. C. A. 9th, 1917); Maryland Casualty Co. v. Eagle River
School Dist., 188 Wis. 520, 205 N. W. 926 (1925). The reason given is
that a company whose business is to insure against risk for profit is not
entitled to the protection given the individual accommodation surety. See
Guaranty Co. v. Pressed Brick Co., 191 U. S. 416, 426, 24 Sup. Ct. 142,
144 (1903); Arnold, The Compensated Surety (1926) 26 Cot. L. RBv. 171,
189. Even where injury is shown, the corporate surety is only discharged
pro tanto. Southern Real Estate Co. v. Bankers' Surety Co., 276 Mo. 183,
207 S. W. 506 (1918). Contra: Morgan v. Salmon, 18 N. M. 72, 135 Pact
553 (1913). Premature payment is said to be necessarily prejudicial to
a surety in that it reduces the incentive of the principal to continue work.
See Fidelity Co. v. Agnew, 152 Fed. 955, 960 (C. C. A. 3d, 1907). And
also because it destroys the security which both the creditor and the
surety derive from payment withheld until due. See American Bonding
Co. v. United States, 233 Fed. 364, 370 (C. C. A. 3d, 1916). Some courts,
however, have found advanced payments actually beneficial to the surety,
as enabling the principal more readily to perform. See Maryland Casualty
Co. v. School Dist., supra, at 527, 205 N. W. at 929; Canton v. Globe In-
demnity Co., 201 App. Div. 820, 824, 195 N. Y. Supp. 445, 447 (3d Dept.
1922). There was no showing of injury in the instant case. On the con-
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trary, R was able to continue work only because of the plaintiff's advance-
rnent.
TAXmATIONx-FEDERAL ESTATE TAX ON Tnusr FUND w=-r Do*on R!TAu-S
LIFE INCOmE.-The federal estate tax provides for the taxation of interest3
which the decedent transferred, or in respect to which he has created a
trust, "in contemplation of or intended to take cffect in posZczzion or
enjoyment at or after his death." U. S. Comp. Stat. (Supp. 1919) §
6336 c. The tstatrix conveyed propurty in tr-ust to V t in thi Ln fi-
ciaries upon her death, but reserving to herself one half the income for
life; the other half of the income to go to the beneficiaries imriediately.
Upon her death the whole fund was taxed as part of her estate. The
executor brought suit for abatement. Held, that the abatement bz alloved
since only half of the fund, the income of which the donor retained for life,
was taxable. Bradley v. Nichols, 13 Fed. (2d) 857 (D. Mass. 1926).
The language of the statute in the instant case is common also to state
taxation statutes. e.g., N. Y. Cons. Laws (1907) § 220. Th pr 1vailij
test in applying such statutes is whether the possession or enjoyment of
the fund is in any way contingent on the donor's death. See MPatter of
Bostwick, 160 N. Y. 489, 494, 55 N. E. 208, 210 (1899) ; Dextcr v. J.ch-on,
243 Mass. 523, 525, 137 N. E. 877, S78 (1923). A reserved power to
change the beneficiaries does not make the vesting of the fund contingent
upon death. Illinois v. Northern Trust Co., 289 Ill. 475, 124 N. E. 002
(1919); Matter of Cochrane, 117 Misc. 18, 190 N. Y. Supp. S95 (Surr.
1921) ; cf. Frick v. Llewellyn, 268 U. S. 238, 45 Sup. Ct. .1- (1925) ; (1925)
34 YALE LAW JoURNAL, 533, 535. But where a trust fund, tg-ctlr vwith the
accumulations was to be paid to beneficiaries at the end of thirty ycarz, it
was held taxable under the statute. Shukcrt v. Allcn, 6 Fed. (2d) 551
(C. C. A. 8th, 1925) (donor 57 years old at time trust created). The
instant case gives due consideration to the need of reasonably limiting
the extent to which an estate can be taxed according to prior interpreta-
tions of "reasonable limitation." Cf. Fidelity & Columbia Tnrut Co. ,.
Lucas, 7 Fed. (2d) 146 (D. Ky. 1925); McCa?,9hJz v. Gi m .d Trri:t Co.,
11 Fed. (2d) 520 (C. C. A. 3d, 1926) (taxable where donor retained incame
for life).
TAXATI N-VALiDrrY OF SuccEssION TAX ON EquiTABLY CONVERTD L~uiz
WrrHIN THE STATE.The testatrix, domiciled in South, Carolina, directed
in her will that her real estate in Pennsylvania be sold to carry out a
legacy to the defendant. The state of Pennsylvania sued to collect a suc-
cession tax on this land. The lower court held for the state, denying the
defendant's contention that, because the will worked an equitable con-
version of the land into personalty, the tax could not be impozed. Held,
on appeal, that the judgment be affirmed. Commonwealth v. Pre~bytcriam
Hospital, 134 Atl. 427 (Pa. 1926).
Earlier Pennsylvania decisions denied the power of the state to tax the
transfer of land within its borders equitably converted into perzonalty by
the will of a non-resident testator. In -c Colcrzan's Estate, 159 Pa. 231,
28 Atl. 137 (1893); In re Arbuckle's Estate, 252 Pa. 161, 97 Atl. 137
(1916). Merely, however, as the logical corollary of the rule allowing the
state to tax the transfer of foreign land so converted by the will of a
resident testator. Miller v. Commomwcalth, 111 Pa. 321, 2 Atl 492 (13S0).
The latter rule, however, has recently been reversed. In re Robinson'e
Estate, 285 Pa. 308, 132 Atl. 127 (1920), extending Friel: v. P un'ylraniq,
268 U. S. 473, 45 Sup. Ct. 603 (1925) (holding invalid a tax on "tangibld"r
personalty permanently outside the state). The criticism of the rule applie-
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to its corollary: the taxing power ordinarily confined to the state of the situs,
should not be changed by a fiction adopted in equity for other purposes.
(1925) 34 YALE LAw JOURNAL, 803; (1925) 73 U. PA. L. REV. 439; (1925) 23
MICH. L. REv. 641. Hence the instant holding seems sound, although the
transfer had already been taxed by means of the fiction in South Carolina.
Land Title Co. v. South Carolina Tar Comm., 131 S. C. 192, 126 S. E. 189
(1925) (criticized in the notes cited supra).
TRUSTS-CREATION BY WILL-VALIDITY AFIER BENEFICIARIES REACH
MAjoRiY.-The testatrx gave the residue of her estate to her two nephews;
only the interest was to be paid them until they reached the age of twenty-
seven, when each was to be given his one-half share. The testatrix then
appointed two executors who petitioned for a final accounting and distribu-
tion. The lower court held that a trust was created as to the residue.
Held, on appeal, that it was "manifest" that no trust was created, and
that the property should have been distributed at once to the nephews.
In re Ogden's Estate, 248 Pac. 680 (Calif. 1926).
No particular form of words is required to create a trust. Hill v. Bishop
of London, 1 Atk. 618 (Ch. 1738); Eschen v. Steers, 10 Fed. (2d) 739
(C. C. A. 8th, 1926). But there must be "unequivocal" language showing
an intention to create a trust. Holsapple v. Shrontz, 65 Ind. App. 390,
117 N. E. 547 (1917) ("to use rentals of said property") ; but of. Colton v.
Colton, 127 U. S. 300, 8 Sup. Ct. 1164 (1888) ("I recommend"). Like-
wise, the subject matter of the trust, the beneficiaries and their interest,
and the manner in which the trust is to be performed should be expressed
with some degree of certainty. Otien v. Frohbach, 148 Wis. 301, 134 N. W.
832 (1912); Citizen's L. & T. Co. v. Herron, 186 Ind. 421, 115 N. E. 941
(1917). Hence the will in the instant case could reasonably have been
construed as evidencing an intention to create a trust. Such intention
should control unless it contravenes some rule of law or policy. Belding
v. Coward, 133 Atl. 689 (Me. 1926). Thus most American courts refuse
to terminate a trust at the request of the absolute equitable owner merely
because his enjoyment is postponed for a period after he has reached his
majority. Claflin v. Claflin, 149 Mass. 19, 20 N. E. 454 (1889); In TO
Hamburger's Will, 185 Wis. 270, 201 N. W. 267 (1924). Otherwise in
England. Saunders v. Vautier, 4 Beav. 115 (Ch. 1841). However, the
English rule is said not to be based on sound policy. See Wharton v. Master-
man [1895] A. C. 186, 193. Nevertheless, it is not without authority in
this country. Turnage v. Greene, 55 N. C. 63 (1854); Huber w. Donoghue,
49 N. J. Eq. 125, 23 Atl. 495 (1892). The fact that no person is desig-
nated "trustee" would not defeat the trust, for the court, if necessary, will
appoint one. Porter v. Bank of Rutland, 19 Vt. 410 (1847); Wittmeier V.
Heiligenstein, 308 Ill. 434, 139 N. E. 871 (1923). However, it would seem
that the testatrix in the instant case intended the persons named as exe-
cutors to also act as trustees. Cf. Goodrum v. Goodrum, 43 N. C. 313
(1852); Moberley's Guardian v. Mt. Sterling Nat'l Bank, 187 Ky. 403, 219
S. W. 423 (1920).
